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NICARAGUAN
RELATIONS
WITHTHENONALIGNED
MOVEMENT
by HARRYE. VANDEN
and
WALTRAUD
MORALES
QUEISER
PRONOUNCEMENTSBY THE Reagan Administrationnot withstanding,the oft repeated accusationthatNicaraguais but a Sovietor
Cubanpawn does not appearconsistentwith a closer examinationof
the facts(see NACLA,1985). Beginning with the original 1969 FSLN
(FrenteSandinistade LiberacionNacional) Program,the Sandinista
leadershipwhich now rules Nicaraguahas steadfastlymaintainedits
nonaligned orientation.In fact,since coming to power,the Sandinistas have not only become active members of the Nonaligned Movement, but have also used their ties with the Nonaligned to explain
their policies and to garnermuch needed internationalsupportfor
theiractions.In the process, they appearto have takenfull advantage
of policy options created by the development of the Nonaligned
Movementand only recently availableto LatinAmericannations.
The nonaligned movement itself was born in the post-colonial
period as increasing numbers of ThirdWorldnations sought to establish a direction in foreign policy which would allow them to ensure a political, if not economic, independence in a world increasingly dominatedby two greatpowers.Rootsof the movementextend
back to 1955 when a group of Afro-Asianstates met as a group to denounce colonialism, promote economic development, and call for
relaxationin world tensions.Josip Broz Tito, an earlyfounder of the
movement,aligned Yugoslaviawith the new group,attackingthe diHarryE. Vandenis Associate Professorof Political Science at the Universityof South Florida,Tampa.He is the authorofJose CarlosMariategui:
Influencias en su Formacion Ideological and he is currentlycompleting a
bibliography of LatinAmerican Marxismand conducting research for a
book on Nicaragua.
WaltraudQueiser Moralesis Associate Professorof PoliticalScience at
the Universityof CentralFlorida,Orlando.She is the authorof Social Revolution: TheoryandHistoricalApplication and of Bolivia; Land ofStruggle.
The authorswish to thank MaryK. Meyerfor assisting with initial research forthis article;and HarryE.Vandenwishes to acknowledge the support of the Division of Sponsored Researchof the Universityof South Florida for the previous field research. The article is based upon the chapter
entitled "Relationswith the Nonaligned Movement,"which appears in
ThomasW Walker(ed.) Nicaragua: TheFirstFive Years,PraegerPublishers, 1985.
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vision of the world into two hostile camps.Atthe firstformalmeeting
of the Nonaligned, twenty-fivenationsgatheredin Belgradein 1961
and focused on the need for world peace. Subsequent nonaligned
summit conferences (Cairoin 1964, Lusakain 1970, Algiersin 1973,
Colombo in 1976, Havanain 1979, and New Delhi in 1983) continued to mention the importanceof an independent foreignpolicy and
to advocatenon-participationin cold warmilitarypacts (despite Pakistan'salignmentwith the United States,and Cuba'seventualties with
the SovietUnion).
As Nicaraguawould do later,Yugoslaviaand a growing number
of ThirdWorldnationsused the new group as a mechanism to chart
theirown course in foreignpolicy and development. Evolutionof the
movement witnessed increasing concern over political hegemony
and economic domination,particularlyby Westernpowers.Thus, as
the focus shifted from world peace and maintaining scrupulous
equidistance between Eastand West,the new emphasis became one
of expressing solidaritywith anti-colonialstruggles, supportingthe
political economy of the New International Economic Order
(NIEO), and openly criticizing perceived Westerndomination in
political or economic areas (LeoGrande,1980: 38, 39). Supportfor
liberation movements graduallybecame the primaryfocus of the
movementwith some nations, like Yugoslaviaand Algeria,warning
of US and Sovietimperialism (the two imperialismsthesis) with another,Cuba,arguingthatthe Socialistcountrieswere naturalallies.l
THE INTER-AMERICANSYSTEM

If conditionsproceeded to change rapidlyin AfricaandAsia,the traditional Inter-Americansystem made nonalignmenta differentstory
in the WesternHemisphere, where, from the (1823) Monroe Doctrine onward,the United Stateshad reserved for itself a hegemonic
position. The United Stateswas to be the firstamong equals and, as
such, to enjoy certainrightsand responsibilitiesforeclosed to lesser
states.As industrialgrowth in the North economically outstripped
the ruralagrarianismof the South, the LatinAmericannations witnessed a varietyof policy instruments:the big stick,gunboatand dollar diplomacyand, finally,the good neighbor policy. Though methods might vary,the end result was alwaysthe same, i.e. to convince
the LatinAmericanstates to follow the US lead. When subtle methods failed, Americanpresidents often sent in the Marinesto secure
the NorthAmericaninterest. Suchwas the case in Nicaragua,where
Marinesintervenedfrom 1910 to 1925 and from 1926 to 1933. The

THENON-ALIGNEDMOVEMENT
VANDEN/QUEISER: NICARAGUAAND

143

last occupation was in response to an indigenous guerrilla movement, Augusto Cesar Sandino'sArmyin Defense of NicaraguanNational Sovereignty.
AfterSandinowas assassinatedin 1934 and his armydisbanded
by the US-organizedNational Guard,the resulting Somoza family
dictatorshipremained in power untilJuly of 1979 and was characterized by almost total subservienceto NorthAmericanpolicy interests.
A Somoza could alwaysdeliver the Nicaraguanvote in crucialmeetings of the United Nations (UN) or the Organizationof American
States (OAS). Nicaragua,like most of her sister republics,remained
closely allied to the United Statesthroughthe thirties,forties,fifties,
and sixties.
Ledby the post-revolutionaryindependence of Mexicanforeign
policy, other LatinAmericanstates pushed to enlarge their parameters of action in foreign affairs.Argentina,under Per6n, remained
neutralduring most of the Second WorldWarand pursued an independent course in the postwarperiod. Buenos Aires asserted its independence by recognizing the Soviet Union in 1946 and developing trade relations with both East and West. Years before the
Colombo Conference, Peronist foreign policy called for a Third
Forcenot aligned with either of the emerging power blocs.
Peronism appeared to insulate Argentina from the Cold War
preoccupation that increasingly colored US relationswith its Latin
neighbors. In 1954 Guatemalan attempts at internal structural
change and a foreign policy involving minimal relationswith Eastern Europebecame the basis for a US campaign characterizingthe
regime as a beachhead for internationalcommunism. The subsequent CIA-sponsored(US CentralIntelligence Agency) coup terminated Guatemala'sexperiment with an independent foreign policy.
Bolivia'sattemptsat structuralchange, following its 1952 revolution,
lasted only a few years until US-induced economic pressure served
to moderatethe course of revolution (see Blasier,1971; and Whitehead, 1969).
Interjectionof the ColdWarinto the hemisphericsystemundercut attemptsat maneuverabilityon the partof the LatinAmericannations, since it was assumed thatcommon cultural,historic,economic, and political ties inextricablybound them to the Westin the North
American"cold war"with EasternCommunism.The Cubancase illustrateshow the US reacted (or overreacted)to nationalistchanges
in internalor external economic and political relationships.Deviation from Westernpolicies was perceived as both unwarrantedand
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active movementtowardcommunism. The kind of foreign policy initiatives that characterized India'srelations with the superpowers
were tolerated in Asia but prohibited in neighboring Latin
America.
In 1961 twenty-fivenations convened in Belgrade for the first
conference of nonaligned nations.Cuba'swas the only LatinAmerican delegation. "Havana's
presence signalled thatCuba'sinternational perspective was undergoing change; the hemisphericparameters
that historicallyhad defined its sphere of concern were being replaced with a vision of itself operatingin concert with kindredAfroAsian states on the largerworld stage" (Erisman, 1983: 150). The
United Statesreacted negatively.As Cubasought new externalalignments, US displeasure increased and was ultimately expressed by
the CIA-sponsoredBayof Pigs invasion.AtNorthAmericaninitiative,
Cubawas excluded fromfull participationin the Inter-American
system in 1962. Not only did this act strainthe system,but it encouraged
Cubato offset its diplomaticisolationthroughmore committed integration into the Nonaligned Movement, and (at different times)
throughstrengtheningties with the Soviet Union and China.
The economic and political realities of the sixties, the example
of Cuba,and a general increase in ThirdWorldindependence and
assertivenesscombined to encourage other LatinAmericannations
to re-evaluateforeign policy options.By the late 1970'san increasing
numberof LatinAmericansexperienced a growing affinitywith the
kind of Third Worldnationalism emanating from meetings of the
Nonaligned Movement. In the years that followed, the movement
came to include severalLatinAmericannations,not only Cuba,Nicaraguaand Perubut also Argentina,Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuadorand
Panama.Venezuela,Brazil,CostaRica,and Mexico attended conferences as observers.The once-small group of twenty-fivehadexpanded to nearly one hundred nations by the time the FSLNdefeated
Somoza'sforces in July of 1979.
NICARAGUAAND THE HISTORIC ROOTS
OF NONALIGNMENT

InBeyond Cuba: Latin America TakesCharge of Its Future, Luigi
Einaudi (1974:32) notes that "LatinAmericannationalismremains
opposed to any form of dependence on Capitalistor Communist
powers;"and, further,"mostLatinAmericanradicalsenvisage a form
of neutralismin world politics, hoping... the sardinescan find room
between the sharks to swim safely."Revolutionaryleaders who
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emerged in Nicaraguawere both radicaland nationalisticand hoped
to chartan independent course as the nationexperienced its second
revolutionfor nationalsovereignty.Indeed, it would appearthatthe
Cubanshad warned them of the dangers inherent in alienating one
sharkonly to be forced to swim in the wake of another.
Lessthantwo monthsafterthe new governmentwas established
in Managua,Nicaraguadecided to become a member of the Nonaligned Movementand to send a delegation to the Sixth Nonaligned
Summit,scheduled to convene in Havanaearly in September 1979.
Declaringthatthe Sandinistasfavoreda restructuringof international relationson the basis of justice together with a new international
economic order,juntamember Daniel Ortega(1982:320) explained
that the Nicaraguanswere joining the Nonaligned Movement because they saw it as "the broadest organizationof the Third World
states thatplay an importantrole and exercise increasing influence
in the internationalarenaand in the people'sstruggleagainstimperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism ..." Nicaragua was clearly taking

a differenttackfrom the dayswhen Somoza had declared he was the
best friendthe US ever had. Subsequently,it would seek to diversify
its diplomaticand economic relationseven more.
To understandreasons for such a shift in Nicaraguanforeign
policy one needs to examine evolution of the Sandinistamovement.
The object of the nationalismof the original Sandinowas to affirm
the principle of nationalsovereigntyand independence. He identified his strugglewith thatof an oppressed people and believed that
all those who suffered oppression should unite in a common struggle (BarricadaInternacional,1984:2). His nationalismsought to liberateNicaraguafromdirect militaryinterventionby,and the political
and economic dominance of, the United States.Sandino'sdefinition
of sovereigntywas fundamentallyanti-hegemonic.Although he antedated the nonaligned movement, Sandino'sappeal to continental
and global opinion demonstratedthe principle of popularsolidarity
and nationalself-determinationwhich would become the hallmark
of the ThirdWorldmovement in Asia and Africa.Characteristically
anti-colonial,his manifestoes were addressed to strugglingpeoples
everywhere:to the Nicaraguanpeople, the people of America,the
Indo-LatinAmerican continent, and to all progressive forces (see
Ramirez,1980). His anti-colonialsentiment grew out of Nicaraguan
historicalexperience and was later to be developed by the FSLNas
the basis of contemporarySandinistaforeign policy. Thus the Nonaligned Movementprovided a "natural,friendly"forum in which to
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express the new policy goals of political pluralism,mixed economy
and internationalnonalignment.The September1979 SixthSummit
of the Non-Alignedcountries in Havanaprovided an ideal occasion
to announce the new Nicaraguanforeign policy (Tinoco, 1984).
Through the Nonaligned Movement,Nicaraguabegan to seek support outside the Inter-AmericanSystem.
As was true of other ThirdWorldcountries, the historicalroots
of Sandinistanonalignmentwere also socio-economic. The new foreign policy which emerged in 1979 was but the external reflection
of an internalrealignmentof class and economic forces destined to
revolutionizeboth domestic and foreign policies. When the Somocista system of economic and political dominationwas broken, with
it went its "captive"foreign policy. Pre-revolutionarydependencies
were challenged; the national interest was defined on Nicaraguan
(not US) terms.Greaterdiversificationin diplomaticand economic
relationswas sought as a way to achieve the new nationalgoals. Nicaraguawould no longer automaticallyfollow the US (or Western)lead
on policy issues. Rather,it would pursue a foreignpolicy based on its
redefined interests. Specific goals might change, but fundamental
tenets would include nonalignment,anti-colonialism,and pluralism
in internalpolitics and internationalrelations.
Nonalignment came to express a newfound independence.
Froma foreign policy which had faithfully"echoed"the opposition
of the United States in internationaland regional forums, like the
UnitedNationsand the Organizationof AmericanStates(OAS) (Nicaraguahad endorsed the interventionin Guatemalain 1954, and had
permitted the use of Puerto Cabezasfor the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba), Nicaraguanforeign policy became fiercely independent. Nonalignment seemed the most effective way to protect its
new autonomy.Unlike its past subservience to US interests,Nicaraguan nonalignment might in future mean criticism of the North
Americanposition in LatinAmericaand the ThirdWorld.However,
this would not necessarily mean that Nicaraguanforeign policy was
categoricallyhostile to that of the United States,but thatthe new regime reserved the right to judge other nations'actions according to
its own criteria.Nicaraguannonalignmentmust,therefore,be understood within the context of the country'srevolutionaryexperience.
The strugglefrom Sandinoto the present imposed a psychological, moral,and even political commitment to support other liberation efforts.A basic condition of membership in the Nonaligned
Movement was support for anti-colonial liberation movements.
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Clearly there was a natural convergence between the goals of the
movement and the historical/philosophical base upon which Nicaraguan foreign policy rested. Thus it would be unreasonable for Nicaraguan foreign policy to ignore other revolutionary struggles,
whether in Central America or other regions of the Third World, simply to demonstrate a nonalignment defined by the United States. Because of its history, the "natural"foreign policy direction of Nicaragua sometimes took positions viewed as anti-American. This was
due as much to the way in which the US defined its foreign policy,
as to the way in which the Nicaraguans conceptualized theirs. Indeed, it may be next to impossible for Nicaragua to define a nonalignment sufficiently consonant with that of the United States since
to do so would suggest continuation of a dependent foreign policy,
even the "Finlandization" of Nicaragua's external aspirations.
THE BIRTH OF A NON-ALIGNED POLICY:
THE SIXTH SUMMIT
"TheNicaraguanpeople have earned the right to be here todaywith
their own blood. In this way they have brokenwith their past history
of servilityto imperialistpolitics (Ortega, 1983:14)
Daniel Ortega,Sixth Summitof the Nonaligned Movement
Nicaragua's entry into the ranks of the Nonaligned implied adoption
of an anti-imperial policy; it sought to amplify the role of Third
World countries in world affairs and, by extension perhaps, to announce its own new activist role. Daniel Ortega justified membership specifically in terms of the struggle of peoples against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, apartheid, racism, Zionism, and
other forms of oppression. He declared Nicaragua's support for the
principles of peaceful coexistence, the absence of blocs and military
alliance systems, justice in international relations, and establishment
of a new international economic order (Ortega, 1983:17).
Ortega argued that "in the Sandinista revolution there is not any
alignment; but an absolute and consistent support for the aspirations
of peoples who have achieved independence or are struggling to do
so. That is why we are nonaligned" (Ortega, 1983:17). This reasoning helps to explain Nicaragua'ssubsequent endorsement of SWAPO
in Namibia, the PLO,the Polisario in the Spanish Sahara,East Timor's
independence, Cuba, and Puerto Rican nationalism during the meeting. Nicaragua thereby assumed a position consistent with that of the
Nonaligned Movement. Meetings of the nonaligned group from the
Foreign Ministers Conference in Georgetown, in August 1972, to the
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1979 HavanaSummitmeeting had all passed resolutions extending
solidarityand support to these groups. Nicaragua'ssupport, therefore, was not unusual for the movement but represented its mainstreamthinking.
Previouslythe Nicaraguanshad received backingin theirliberation struggle;now they would support similar struggles elsewhere.
At the foreign ministers meeting held in New York,on 2 October
1978, the NonalignedMovementhad supportedthe ongoing revolution in Nicaraguaby issuing a resolution criticizingthe Somozagovernment (Nicaragua.Ministeriodel Exterior,n.d.). Subsequentministerial meetings (New Delhi, February9-13, 1981; Havana,May
31-June 5, 1982; and October 4-9, 1982) of the Nonaligned countries continued to follow post-revolutionarydevelopments in Nicaragua, focusing global attentionon CentralAmericaninstability,growing political and economic pressure on Nicaragua, and the
interventionistrole of-the United States in El Salvador(Nicaragua.
Ministeriodel Exterior,n.d.). Forexample, the ministerialmeeting
at New Delhi "condemned the political and economic aggression,
both direct or through certain internationalfinancial organizations,
which was being exercised or attemptedagainstNicaraguain order
to interferewith the revolutionaryprocess" (Nicaragua.Ministerio
del Exterior,n.d.). By the early 1980's, the meetings of the Nonaligned Movementhad become the principalplace where Nicaragua's
foreignpolicy position could be explained and understood.As Nicaraguasupported other liberationmovements, so would others support its revolution.Doing so became a matterof diplomaticsurvival.
Thatwas why the "Extraordinary
MinisterialMeeting of the Coordinating Bureauof the Non-AlignedCountrieson LatinAmericanand
the Caribbean,"in Managua,from January10 to 14, 1983, was so
important.
NONALIGNMENT AND DEFENSE OF THE REVOLUTION

This special ministerialmeeting served as something of a diplomatic "coup"for Nicaragua.Firstof all world attentionwas attractedto
the small nation as delegates from 89 countries, liberationgroups,
and internationalinstitutions,all converged as both members and
observers.Locatingthe meeting in Managuaalso contributedto the
diplomatic (as well as economic and political) survivalof the Sandinista governmentfor,as Alan Riding observed, "byacting as host
atthe meeting... Nicaraguaappearedto havesucceeded in focusing
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(attention) on the growing number of attacksby Honduras-based
anti-Sandinistarebels into northernNicaragua"(Riding, 1983a:7).
Initially, the declaration prepared by Nicaragua and Cuba
"called specifically for condemnation of US support for antiSandinistagroups based in Honduras"(Riding, 1983b:4). Subsequently,however,some of the Non-AlignedMovement(NAM)moderatessympatheticto the United States (such asJamaica,Egypt,and
Singapore) were able to "soften"the final draft,2so that it called
merely for peaceful resolution of the differences between the warringgroups in El Salvador,and fornegotiationsto takeplace between
the United Statesand Nicaragua.It was significant,though, that the
meeting concentratedprimarilyupon the situationin CentralAmerica, the firsttime the NAMhad devoted so much of its attentionto one
region of the world, and particularlyto Latin America (Tinoco,
1984). HenceforthLatinAmericanproblemswould no longer be the
exclusive province of the OAS,so often dominated by the US, nor
would Nicaragua be isolated from the world movement it had
helped to develop.
The Managuameeting also served two otherfunctions:(1) it set
the stage to continue discussion of the CentralAmericansituationat
the upcoming summit conference scheduled to be held in New
Delhi two months later (7-12 March,1983); and (2) it contributed
to a marshallingof diplomatic support when, also in March1983,
Nicaraguabroughtcomplaints of acts of aggression directed against
itself before the SecurityCouncil.
Nicaraguahad alreadyreaped some rewardsfrom its new internationalizedforeign policy the previous Fall,when it had been elected as one of the non-permanentmembers of the SecurityCouncil on
19 October 1982. At the time the United States had lobbied vigorously against Nicaraguafor this position, preferringto support the
nominationof the Dominican Republicinstead. Despite this powerful opponent Nicaraguahad succeeded in musteringthe 104 countryvotes needed to acquire the two-thirdsmajority.Nicaragua'selection was widely perceived as a major defeat for the United States
(Keesing's,1983: 31933).3 The election was significantin thatit also
provided Nicaraguawith immediate access to the SecurityCouncil
in the event of a threatto its nationalsecurity.4
Six months later,on 23 March1983, Nicaraguatook advantage
of this status and requested that the Security Council convene to
hearsuch a charge.Nicaraguadenounced US aggression in the form
attacksfrom Honduras,suggestof increasingcounter-revolutionary
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ing they were just the most recent examples of the ReaganAdminisecret war (UN Chronicle,1983b: 3-22).
stration'sCIA-orchestrated
As had been the case at the New Delhi summit of the NAM,
Nicaragua's
position was reaffirmedby the UN.5'Afterfourdaysofocheated
debate on the fighting in Nicaragua,the US [becasionally
in the SecurityCouncil in its attemptsto porisolated
came]virtually
the
conflict
as
an
internal
tray
Nicaraguanaffair"(Nossiter, 1983:I,
1).
Countriesfrequently allied with the United States in the past
were now either skeptical or openly criticalof US policy in Central
America, specifically as it affected Nicaragua.Among them were
Mexico,Venezuela,Spain,Pakistan,India,the Netherlands,Panama,
and France.Supportfor Nicaraguawas even strongeramong sympathetic nonaligned nations like Tanzania,Zaire and Algeria. Jeane
Kirkpatrickwas so annoyed at their attitudethat she was quoted as
havingroundlycondemned the "systematicbias,systematiclies, systematicredefinitionof key politicalvalues and distortionof keypolitical processes" (U.N. Chronicle,1983b:18).6 This development certainly validated Nicaragua'spolicy of nonalignment which had
intended to use the ThirdWorldmovement not just as a forum for
dissemination of objective, sympatheticinformationon the Nicaraguan revolution,but as a medium for diplomaticdefense and initiative.Tellingly,only Hondurasand El Salvadorsided stronglywith the
United States in the UN debates. The Nonaligned Movement,and
throughit, othernonaligned ThirdWorldcountriesin the United Nations, came to the defense of the Nicaraguanrevolution.Unlike Guatemalain 1954, Nicaraguawas not isolated and overthrownby a CIAbacked invasion.Nicaraguandiplomacyhad guaranteedits access to
ThirdWorldcountriesand extra-hemisphericorganizationsnot subordinatedto policy constraintsimposed by regional US hegemony.

THECONSOLIDATION
OF THEREVOLUTION:
THESEVENTHSUMMITAND AFTER
At the veryfirstmeeting of the NAMattendedby Nicaragua,in 1979,
paniel Ortega had linked consolidation of the NicaraguanRevolution with strengthening the struggle of other underdeveloped nations.Atthe SeventhSummithe made it clearthatthe struggleforliberation in Nicaraguacontinued, and that Nicaragua "needed the
disinterested assistance of the nonaligned nations"more than ever
(U.N. Chronicle, 1983b:25). Both these and subsequent declara-
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tions indicated two importantaspects of Nicaraguanforeign policy
in its relationswith the ThirdWorld.LikeGuatemalaand Cubaat an
earliertime, Nicaraguawas totallyoccupied with the securitythreat
posed by the US, and feared for consolidation of its revolution.Unlike Cuba between 1959 and 1962, however,Nicaraguadecided to
createthe appropriateinternationalclimate forrevolutionaryconsolidationby establishing close solidaritywith the ThirdWorld,rather
thanwith the SovietUnion.7Internationalism,but of a somewhatdifferentvarietythan the internationalismof Cuba,was seen as a major
weapon for national self-defense. Through a "diversifieddependence" on many differentnations,but with special ties to the nonaligned countries, Nicaraguahoped to fend off aggressive actions by
the US.8Unlike Cuba,Nicaraguawas able to avoida hemisphericdiplomatic isolation imposed by the United States.As more and more
LatinAmericancountriesjoined the Nonaligned Movement(at New
Delhi membership increased to 101 countries including 10 Latin
Americanand Caribbeanmembers) it became more difficultto isolate Nicaraguain the same way as had been done with Cuba. The
new arenawas broader,the nationalactorsmore independent.
Nicaraguaattemptedto act as a bridge between the positions of
the radical members of the Nonaligned Movement and the proWesterncountries. It accepted neither the "naturalally" thesis of
Cuba, which saw in the socialist countries, especially the Soviet
Union, a naturalalliance of dependent, developing countries; nor
had Nicaraguaespoused the "two imperialisms"thesis of Algeria,
who feareddominationof both advancedcapitalistand advancedsocialist systems over dependent countries (Erisman, 1983:157-164
and Envio, 1983:10). Nicaragua'spreferred position in previous
summits appeared to be with the "pivotal"states (like Tanzania).
These were not as radicalas the Cubansbut more radicalthanthe Yugoslavs: they were in the middle of the nonaligned group.9This
"middlegroup"practicedtrue "flexiblenonalignment,"at times siding with the radicalsand at others with the moderates, depending
upon issue and circumstance.Nicaragua,in confrontingthe military
and economic opposition of the United States, and the extensive
needs of revolutionaryreconstruction,could not affordideological,
or anyotherformof, exclusivity.Moreover,its policy in action,as well
as in philosophy, proved to be genuinely "more"nonaligned than
thatof Cuba.
A majorissue confronted Nicaraguashortlyafterits revolution,
and after its delegation had been seated in the United Nations:the
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Sovietinvasionof Afghanistan.The Nicaraguanvote on Afghanistan
has been repeatedly cited as an example of Nicaragua'ssupport of
the SovietUnionand of its incorporationinto the Sovietbloc, to paraphrase US Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick (U.N. Chronicle,
1983b:14). US pronouncements aside, Nicaraguadid not vote with
the Sovietbloc nations.On 14 January1980, in the SixthEmergency
Special Session of the United Nations,under the "unitingfor peace
resolution,"the membersvoted 104 in favor,18 opposed (with 18 abstentions) on a resolutioncalling forimmediatewithdrawalof Soviet
troops from Afghanistan.
The question of Afghanistanprovedto be a difficultone for Nicaraguanforeignpolicy.On the one handtherewas clearsympathyfor
a small ThirdWorldnationcaughtin the hegemonic embraceof a superpowerwho considered militaryinterventiona policy option. On
the other hand, the Afghan guerrillaswere opposed to policies to
which the Sandinistaswere fundamentallycommitted: literacycampaigns; mass education; equality for women; and social change.
While the Nicaraguanswanted to adhere to their stated policy of
nonintervention,at the same time prudence advised thatthey not alienate themselves from a potential supporter (the USSR) or from
those who might become (if the US imposed the same constraintsit
had on Cuba) a potential economic lifeline (the Easternbloc).
Both superpowersmade the Afghanvote a test of support,if not
a sine qua non for furtherfriendlyrelations.The USSRput considerable pressureon friendlyregimes to vote againstthe resolution.This
was reflected in the final vote; those voting against included both
Soviet-blocnations and those Nonaligned countries sympatheticto
the Soviet Union: Cuba, Angola, Grenada, Ethiopia and Mozambique. Duringthe debate,Nicaraguaincluded "thepresence of Soviet forces"in Afghanistanamong the events which threatenedworld
peace (U.N. Chronicle, 1980:5-7), which may have led some Western nations to believe that Nicaraguawould vote for the solution to
withdraw.Suchwas not the case. Nicaraguadid not vote with the majorityof Nonaligned;rather,it opted for the studiously neutralposition of nonaligned nationslike India,Algeria,Cyprusand Finlandby
abstaining.It followed the same course on the second Afghanvote
in 1984. Similarly,in the September 1983 SecurityCouncil resolution criticizing the Soviet downing of the Koreanairliner,in which
269 died, Nicaraguaagainabstained,as did China,Guyana,and Zimbabwe,on grounds that doubts as to the facts existed (U.N. Chronicle, 1983a:19).
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Nicaragua'sinterpretationof nonalignmentwas not alwaysone
of neutrality,as illustratedby the Nicaraguanposition on the USinvasion of Grenada.In October 1983, Nicaraguainitiateda resolutionin
the SecurityCouncil to end armed interventionin Grenadaand to
begin immediate withdrawalof troops, deploring this as a violation
of internationallaw by the US.Whenthe resolutionwas vetoed by the
US, in the Security Council, Nicaraguathen reintroduced it in the
GeneralAssembly in November,where the US action was deplored
by a vote of 108 for and 9 against,with 27 abstaining.Nicaraguanot
only supportedthe resolutionbutwas its authorand promoter.In the
debate Nicaraguadescribed the US interventionas "nakedarmedaggression" (U.N. Chronicle, 1983a:15). Some observers interpreted
the Grenadavote as proof of Nicaragua'santi-American(and, by implication, pro-Soviet) alignment. An alternativeexplanation flows
from an appreciationof the geographical proximity of Grenadato
Nicaraguaand the comparisonsthat had previously been made between Grenadaand Nicaraguaby the ReaganAdministrationand by
the Nicaraguansthemselves, in which the Grenadianintervention
had been described as a "dryrun"for Nicaragua.Faced with an apparentthreatto its security,the Nicaraguansreasonedthatthe Grenadian interventionwas a precedent which had to be forcefully condemned both to uphold the principle of non-interventionand to
protect the Nicaraguanrevolution.
If the United Statesinterpretedthe Nicaraguanvotes on Afghanistanand Grenadain terms of "he who is not with us is againstus,"1
the nonaligned nations did not. Nicaragua'selection to the Security
Council, in contrastto the earlierfailureof Cubato be so elected, indicatedthatNicaraguahad been accepted by the Nonalignednations
as one of them. In contrastto Nicaragua'selection to the Security
Council, Cuba's1980 bid for a council seat had been blocked by
India and Nigeria,and the election deadlocked after 156 ballots.Although Cuba chaired the Nonaligned Movementat the time, it was
viewed by many in the movement as too radicaland not trulynonaligned (LeoGrande,1980:50). The support for Nicaragua'scharges
of US aggression at the March1983 New Delhi Seventh Summitof
Nonaligned nations and in the United Nations in March,May,and
Septemberof the same year,all evidenced the growing acceptance
of Nicaraguaamong members of the NAMand the world community
at large.At the 38th General Assembly Daniel Ortega emphasized
this point: "Thereis agreementamong verydifferentideological positions throughoutthe world in condemning the aggressiveand bel-
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licose escalationoccurringin the CentralAmericanregion and in demanding that dialogue be the means for resolving these problems"
(U.N.Chronicle,1984a:12).
In the Nonaligned Movement,as in the United Nations,Nicaraavoided
gua
siding with either the most radicalor the most conservative blocs. Unless its nationalinterestor foreign policy goals were directly involved, Nicaragua has tried to establish a position both
flexible and conciliatory,strongly affirmingthe principle of nonalignment while emphasizing opposition to imperialismand support
for liberationstruggles.Nicaraguaperceives unity as the movement's
greatest strength and exerting leverage in the internationalforum,
especially in the reform of the internationaleconomic system, a
majorNicaraguagoal.
In the firstUN session in which the Sandinistagovernmentwas
represented, Daniel Ortega employed the term "the unity of the
weak'"and, at the 1983 ManaguaNAMministerial meeting, he explained the Nicaraguanposition:
It is true that ours are countries with their own characteristicsand
even with diverse ideological and political positions, but they are
also countries with shared problems and objectives. Ours are poor,
dependent countries in an unfaireconomic orderthatare exposed to
political, militaryand economic attacksand pressures;countries that
cannot win the battle for justice and freedom individually;countries
that need large-scale solidarity in order to stand up against the oppression that the colonial, industrial,and technological metropoles
have institutionalized, bringing pain and povertyto our peoples.
Therefore,the most importantthing to preserve is the unity of
this Movement.Our enemy knows of our differences and will tryto
play on them in order to divide, fragment and destroy us (NAM,
1983:37-38).

The SeventhSummitof the Movementhighlighted the convergence
of ThirdWorldinterests and goals with those of Nicaraguanforeign
policy.Defense of the Nicaraguanrevolutionand its consolidationby
means of ThirdWorldsolidaritywould benefit both Nicaraguaand
the Nonaligned Movement,Nicaraguaargued. Daniel Ortega even
termed Nicaraguaas the "strategicreserve of the Nonaligned Countries Movement" (Nicaragua. ExtraordinaryMinisterial Meeting,
1983:42). The 7th summit (March 1983) issued the strongest denunciation to that date of contra and US acts of aggression against
Nicaragua,described there as "a deliberate plan to harassand destabilize that country"(CIC,1983:15).
Continued attacks on Nicaraguanterritory,mining of its harbors,and severalnavalattackspromptedNicaragua'sforeign ministry
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to intensify its diplomaticactivitiesin the United Nations,the Organization of AmericanStates,the ContadoraGroup,before the International Court of Justice, and especially in the Nonaligned Movement, as measures designed to ease the criticalsituationin Central
America.In March1984 Nicaraguadenounced externalattackson its
territoryin the UN SecurityCouncil and also succeeded in convening an emergency session of the CoordinatingBureauof the Nonaligned Movement(Barricada,1984:5). The diplomaticoffensivewas
particularlyurgent to counteractapprovalby the US Senate of $21
million to fund (a) covertCIAoperationsin the region, (b) US militaryaid to Hondurasand (c) escalationof UStroopand navalmaneuvers in the region. Nicaraguadenounced the US attemptto "create
the political, propagandistic,and internationalpsychologicalconditions for the acceptance of the presence of permanentNorthAmerican combat troops in CentralAmerica"(El Nuevo Diario, 1984a:9).
Otherinitiativesincluded obtaininga decision by the Geneva-based
General Agreement on Tariffsand Trade (GATT)that reduction of
the US sugar quota from 58,000 short tons to 6,000 had been discriminatoryand politically motivated (Barricada,1984b:21 and El
Nuevo Diario,1984b:1 and 10).
Likemanysmall nonaligned nations,Nicaragualooked to internationallaw and the WorldCourtto protect its sovereignty.As the full
dimension of the Reagan Administration'sinvolvement with the
counterrevolutionaries(contras) emerged, the NicaraguanGovern'ment decided to take its well-documented case of US intervention
before the InternationalCourtofJustice (ICJ),where the Sandinistas
achieved anotherdiplomaticvictory.In Mayof 1984, the ICJunanimously called upon the US to "immediatelycease and refrainfrom
any actions restricting,blocking or endangering access to or from
Nicaraguanports, and in particular,the layingof mines"while a final
decision on the Nicaraguancomplaintwas being considered. On 26
November1984 the WorldCourtdenied the US claim thatthe Court
lacked standing to hear the complaint and ruled that it did indeed
have jurisdictionin the case, which Nicaragua,with the help of the
US law firmof Reichterand Applebaum,had broughtbefore it (New
YorkTimes:1984). ReaganAdministrationattemptsto question the
jurisdictionof the court clearly cost it internationaland domestic
supportand helped to underline the illegality of US actions supporting the contras Revelationsregarding the CIA Manualplus documented atrocitiesby the contrasprovedto be majorfactorsin the initial refusalof the US Congress to continue to fund the contras, and
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they furtherbuttressed Nicaragua'scredibilitywith the Nonaligned
Movement."

CONCLUSION
Nicaragua's active and successful participationin the Nonaligned
Movementdemonstratesa close affinitybetween its historicalexperience and philosophical foundations and those of other anticolonial, developing nations.Nicaragua'sstaturein the movement is
largelythe consequence of a foreign policy of greaterdiversityand
flexibility than that of Cuba, that is, it is a truly nonaligned foreign
policy. The world, despite repeated assertionsto the contraryby the
ReaganAdministration,is not clearlydivided into EastandWest.This
reality has given Nicaraguamore alternatives than were open to
Cubaearlier.Nicaraguahas managedto breakthe hemisphericmold
by not limiting its foreign policy options. Diversityin foreign policy
has been expressed by establishing relationsacrossa broadfrontencompassing WesternEuropeancountries, the Nonaligned nations,
LatinAmerica,and the Socialistbloc. The internationalassistancereceived, patternsof internationaltrade,and voting recordsin international organizations demonstrate both diversity and
nonalignment.12

Since 1979, the Sandinistaregime has charteda new, highly independent foreignpolicy course. In so doing, it not only placed itself
squarelywithin the Nonaligned Movementbut was able to bring the
Movement'sperspectivesand politics to bear on Nicaragua'sposition
as an independent state in a region traditionallydominated by assumptionsof US hegemony.This new foreign policy has maximized
the decisionmaking latitude of Nicaraguaand made nonalignment
much more possible for other LatinAmericanstates.When the Reagan regime was unsympatheticto Nicaragua,through initiatives at
Nonaligned Summitmeetings and in the UN,the Sandinistagovernment achieved a series of diplomatic successes and foreign policy
firsts,and, on at least one occasion even managed to isolate the US
in the United Nationson the basis of the latter'saggressiveactionstoward Nicaragua.
Trueto its origins and to its nonaligned foreign policy, Nicaragua has carefully cultivated relations with the Nonaligned Movement and has used these ties to acquire supportat a crucial time in
the development of its revolution.Thus, at the very time thatthe US
was increasing external pressure on Nicaraguain early 1983, the
Nicaraguangovernmentsucceeded in hosting a special meeting of
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Nonaligned ministers.The resulting "ManaguaCommunique"supportedthe Nicaraguanposition and criticizedUSpolicy in the region
(Keesing's,1983:32349-55). The public attentionforced the US and
Hondurasto proceed much more carefully than before,thusminimizing the possibility of direct invasionof Nicaraguanterritory.
The NonalignedMovementhas maximized decision autonomy;
it has provided a true third alternativeby which a small dependent
nationlike Nicaraguacan exert influence and achieve foreign policy
goals. As a forum to disseminate informationto the peoples of the
world, the Nonaligned Movementhas served as a naturalinstrument
of denunciation of US actions against the Nicaraguangovernment.
Membershipin the Nonaligned Movementhas permittedNicaragua
to marshalextracontinentalsupportfor its policies and the necessary
votes to counteractUS influence in the OASand the United Nations.
Froma Nicaraguanperspective,the Movementhas been centralto its
foreign policy priorities of self-defense, internationalism, and
autonomy.
The revolutionarygovernment carefully cultivated good relations with all segments of the Nonaligned Movement(and other nations who respect nonalignment) and utilized those ties successfully to achieve its policy objectives.By doing so, Nicaraguawas able to
restrainthe type of CIA-organized,externally-basedaggressive action that had overthrownthe Arbenz Governmentin Guatemalain
1954. Likewise,it was able to forestall the type of diplomatic and
economic isolationwhich had forced Cubato rely ever more heavily
on the SovietUnion. Finally,a small CentralAmericanstate has been
able to show thatthere are indeed manyschools of fish in the oceans
of the world and thatone need not swim in the wake of anyone large
fish for fear of being eaten by another (see Arevalo,1961).
NOTES
1. Radicalizationof the Nonaligned Movementstrainedthe definition
of nonalignment.Morethan rhetoricalbattles,the success and solidarityof
the movementinvolved its self-definition.Criticsof the nonaligned havefocused upon the movement'sconfusion as deviationsfrom true neutralism.
Membersof the movement have themselves disputed non-consensual interpretations of non-alignment, witness the 1979 Havana Summit
Meeting.
One interpretationof nonalignmentwas given by Nigeria'sUN ambassador,Akporode Clark:"there are no natural allies" for the nonaligned.
That is, nonalignment requires flexibility in alignment, a tendency which
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mayshift overtime and with circumstance,accordingto a nation'sinterests,
and not be locked into any particularcamp. (LeoGrande,1980:51.)
2. Egypthad been criticalof the Cubanposition in the Movementever
since the 1978 ForeignMinisters'meeting in Belgrade,and had challenged
Cuba'scredentialsas a nonaligned nation. In turn,at the 1979 Havanasummit, Cubasucceeded in obtaining an 18-month suspension of Egyptfrom
the Movementbecause of the CampDavid accords.Singapore,also unsympatheticto the Cubanposition in the movement (along with SriLanka,Malaysia,India, and Yugoslavia), opposed Cubanand Vietnamesesupportof
the pro-Soviet Heng Samrin government in Kampuchea (Cambodia)
againstthe pro-Chinese Pol Potregime. (LeoGrande,1980:45,48, and 49.)
3. Nicaraguawas elected as one of 54 members of ECOSOC(UN Economic and Social Council) untilJanuary1984. Forfurtherinterpretationof
the UN events also see the New YorkTimes (1983) and the UN Chronicle
(1983b). The Nicaraguanaddress and charges of US aggression were debated on 23-25 and 28-29 March,1983.
4. As an historical note, it should be pointed out that Guatemalawas
denied access to the UN SecurityCouncil in 1954 when the US representative,who served as president forthatmonth, refused to place the Guatemalan charges on the agenda, referringthe issue to the US-dominatedOAS.
See inter alia, Immerman(1982).
5. Panama,for example, interpretedthe Nicaraguanaction in the UN
as confirming the assessment of the situation in CentralAmericamade by
the New Delhi summit meeting of Nonaligned countries (UN Chronicle,
1983b:16).
6. Algeria, for example, was outspoken in its support:"The Sandinist
Revolutionrepresented the ultimate rehabilitationof peoples through the
triumphof freedom and justice over oppression and repression. Thatwas
why it had won deep sympathyand broad support throughout the world,
which was reflected in Nicaraguabeing accorded a seat in the Council and
being welcomed to the Nonaligned Movementas a democraticforce.Algeria hoped the Council would deter all aggressive and destabilizing attempts against Nicaragua"(UN Chronicle, 1983b:18).
7. To compare with Cuba,see Erisman(1983:150).
8. Termused in Envio (1983:12). This was also the thesis of Xavier
Gorostiaga,who described "the diversificationof economic and political
dependence" as a way to maintain geopolitical and geostrategic balance
with the US and forge a new regional, geopolitical solution to the Central
Americancrisis (Gorostiaga,1984:34 & 47-48).
9. LeoGrande(1980:50) used these phrases and concepts, although
not in reference to Nicaragua.
10. Termused byJordanin support of Nicaraguain the UN debate of
March1983, see UN Chronicle (1983b:19).
11. See, inter alia, AmericasWatchReport(1985), to wit, "In combination, the contra forces have systematicallyviolated the applicable laws
of war throughout the conflict. They have attacked civilians indiscriminately; they have tortured and mutilated prisoners; they have murdered
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those placed hors de combat by their wounds; they have taken hostages;
and they have committed outragesagainstpersonaldignity"(p. 6). This report also, however,noted same abuses by the Nicaraguangovernment in
1981 and 1982 but noted that they ceased after 1982 (p. 4).
12. Aid and tradefigures vary.An Envio (1983:12-13) study,based on
the work of Gorostiagaand others, noted internationalloans to Nicaragua
in these percentages:49.4%fromThirdWorldcountries;32%fromcapitalist countries, and 18.5%from Socialist bloc countries (including Cuba).
From1979-1982 WesternEurope provided 33%of Nicaraguanloans. The
NicaraguanForeign Ministrydid not provide exact figures but indicated
thatthe primarysource of economic assistanceto Nicaraguawas fromLatin
America,particularlyMexico, Venezuela, and Cuba;Argentina,Colombia
and Brazilhad also extended credits.The assistance of the Arabcountries,
particularlyLibyaand Algeria, had been essential as a majorsource of liquid assets as opposed to credit lines. Tradestatisticsindicated that 31%of
Nicaraguanexports were with the US, 29%with Centraland South America; importswere 55%from Centraland South America,27%from the US,
10%fromWesternEurope,and 2%fromSocialistcountries.In BarricadaInternacional (ArchivesBarricada,1983: 3) tradefor 1983 was given as 47%
of importsfromthe ThirdWorld,19%fromthe United States,and 12%from
Socialist countries. Since 1979, Nicaraguanleaders have traveledwidely
around the world: Daniel Ortegato the United Nations (US), India, Mexico, Panama,Colombia, Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador,Peru, Argentina, and
manyAsiancountries;Sergio RamfrezthroughoutWesternEurope,the Socialist countries and Asia;TomasBorge to France,Spain,WestGermany,Italy,Portugal,Greece, The Netherlands,and Libya;and other leadersto Costa
Rica,Mexico, Belgium, and so on (also see Malley,1985; and Schwaband
Sims, 1985). ForeignMinistryviews are based on an interviewwith Deputy
ForeignMinisterVictorHugo Tinoco (1984).
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